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Religious Freedom in a Secular Society: 
The Case of the Islamic Headscarf 
in France
Nicky Jones
One of the most interesting examples in recent years of a confrontation between 
secular and religious values occurred in France in the so-called ‘affair of the headscarf ’. 
The affair can be traced back to events in 1989, which were followed by a further 
series of events during the 1990s. It started when a public school in Creil, a town 
in northern France, expelled three Muslim schoolgirls for refusing to remove the 
Islamic headscarves they wore to school. The expulsions were widely reported in 
French and international media and were followed by further expulsions of other 
Muslim schoolgirls in towns and cities across the country, accompanied by growing 
community protests.
The affair was controversial for a variety of reasons. For one thing, it revolved around 
the headscarf, an item of clothing that has historically had strong and sometimes 
conflicting political, religious, cultural and social connotations. During the events of 
the affair, the headscarf sent a range of messages that were ‘heavy with symbolism’,1 
a symbolism which could be powerful, complex and indeed contradictory.
Another important set of reasons for the controversy surrounding the affair was that 
it struck a social, political and cultural ‘nerve’: the principal parties in the affair were 
Muslim schoolgirls, many of whom were the children of immigrant families already 
likely to experience high unemployment and religious or racial discrimination and 
to live in poor housing conditions. In addition, the headscarf became associated 
1 Françoise Gaspard and Farhad Khosrokhavar, Le foulard et la République (1995) 19.
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with social policies of integration and assimilation, despite the fact that many of the 
Muslim girls concerned had been born or had grown up in France. The events also 
served as a powerful catalyst for conservative political parties and groups who became 
involved in the public debates to promote an anti-Muslim or anti-immigration 
agenda and to criticise the apparent failure or unwillingness of the schoolgirls to 
integrate into mainstream French culture.
However, one of the key issues was the fundamental role of secularism in France. The 
principle of secularism is a central tenet of French public policy, particularly where 
public education is concerned. In addition, secularism represents a set of social and 
cultural values that have profound historical resonances for many French people. 
The events also revived historical debate over the role of religion and the operation 
of secularism and secular institutions in public life in France.
This chapter will discuss some of the significant events in the affair of the headscarf, 
including the 1989 legal opinion delivered by France’s highest administrative court, 
the Conseil d’État, which stated the legal principles to be followed in resolving the 
disputes, as well as key ministerial circulars issued to explain how the legal opinion 
was to be applied and the case law from the appeals brought by many of the expelled 
schoolgirls. The chapter will also consider the development of secularism in France 
and the notion of rights and duties, which was integral to the doctrine of secularism, 
as emphasised in the 1989 legal opinion and then applied in the ‘headscarf ’ case 
law.
Finally, this chapter will consider some lessons that can be learned from the affair 
of the headscarf in France: should a government legislate against clothing and what 
issues arise in relation to such legislation? How might religious freedoms be best 
protected? Should religious protections (or indeed secularism itself ) be narrowly or 
broadly defined? A broadly-defined protection might in practice afford a degree of 
flexibility which results in greater application and better outcomes for those whom 
it protects. I also note some events that have occurred in Australia in recent years 
which raise similar questions to those considered in relation to the French affair of 
the headscarf: what does secularism mean in a country such as Australia and what 
might be its implications for cultural and religious freedom and restrictions on such 
freedom?
The affair of the headscarf in France
Affair of the headscarf in 1989
The first incidents in the affair took place on 18 September 1989, at the start of 
the new school year. Three Muslim schoolgirls, 14-year-old Fatima, her 15-year-old 
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sister Leila and their 14-year-old friend Samira, came to their lower secondary school 
in Creil wearing their headscarves. The girls refused to remove the headscarves when 
asked to do so by the school principal and teachers, who interpreted their refusal as 
a breach of secularism in public education, and immediately suspended them from 
the school.
The girls’ suspension attracted considerable media attention. Over the following 
weeks, national newspapers featured front-page stories describing similar incidents 
taking place in other cities across France, in which other Muslim schoolgirls were 
also expelled for wearing their headscarves to school.2 There was heated debate in 
the media over the principle of secularism and the girls’ rights to equality, education 
and freedom of religious belief.
On 9 October, following departmental intervention, meetings with the parents and 
mediation on the part of local cultural associations, the three Creil girls returned 
to school. The negotiations had identified a compromise: the girls could wear their 
headscarves anywhere they wished within school grounds but would lower the scarves 
to their shoulders while in classes.
However, 10 days after they had agreed to the compromise, the three schoolgirls 
breached the agreement by refusing to lower their headscarves in class. It was noted 
in the media that their actions followed meetings between the girls’ fathers and 
a representative of the Fédération Nationale des Musulmans de France, a Muslim 
association that was setting itself up in opposition to the more moderate Paris 
Mosque.3 The girls were again suspended, removed from their classes and taken to 
the school library. Their suspension resulted in a five-hour meeting between their 
teachers and parents, the education authorities and representatives from cultural 
associations in a vain attempt to reach a new agreement.4 According to one analysis, 
this was the point at which ‘the dimension of this problem changed’ and ‘the affair 
exploded, particularly in relation to the media’.5
Clearly, there was considerable confusion over whose responsibility it was to negotiate 
and resolve the various cases. The father of one schoolgirl in Lille called for clarification 
of the legal principles underpinning the affair: ‘If the State decides that the headscarf 
is prohibited at school, I will agree. It is the State. But the teachers cannot decide 
that it is forbidden’. His appeal was supported by Abdsamad Aïfoute, president of 
the Montpellier section of the Association of Islamic Students in France:
2 Ibid 14–5.
3 Ibid 15–6.
4 Élisabeth Chikha, ‘Chronologie’ (1990) 1129 Hommes et Migrations 1, 2.
5 Fabien Collet, La Laïcité, une doctrine de l’Éducation nationale (Diplôme d’Études Approfondies 
(Administration publique) thesis, Université des Sciences sociales de Grenoble, 1995) 17.
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The government must decide its position very soon. This problem concerns all 
school-age children. It’s ridiculous to prevent them from attending school when 
nothing in the [school rules] forbids them to wear the Islamic headscarf.6
On 23 October, the teaching and administrative staff of the Creil school wrote to the 
Minister for National Education, Lionel Jospin, asking him to ‘express a clear opinion 
on a question which has gone national in order to restore calm to the school’.7
On 4 November, Jospin sought the opinion of the Conseil d’État, France’s highest 
administrative court, whose function is to advise the government on legislative and 
administrative matters,8 on whether ‘the wearing of signs of affiliation to a religious 
community is or is not compatible with the principle of secularism’.9
Legal opinion of the Conseil d’État
After three weeks of deliberations, the Conseil d’État delivered its opinion on 
27 November 1989, entitled ‘The wearing of signs showing affiliation to a religious 
community (Islamic headscarf )’. In summary, the Conseil d’État ruled that wearing 
religious signs such as the Islamic headscarf was ‘not by itself incompatible with the 
principle of secularism, insofar as it constitutes the exercise of freedom of expression 
and freedom of manifestation of religious beliefs’. Accordingly, students could wear 
‘signs of religious affiliation’ in public schools without compromising the principles 
of secularism or secular public education, and wearing the headscarf could not, in 
isolation, lead to a student’s suspension or expulsion.
However, the Conseil d’État noted certain restrictions on the exercise of the students’ 
freedoms. The freedoms could be limited if the signs of religious affiliation, by their 
‘ostentatious or protesting’ character or by the conditions in which they were worn, 
constituted an act of pressure, provocation, proselytism or propaganda, jeopardised 
the dignity or freedom of the students wearing the signs or of other students or 
staff, compromised health or safety, disrupted teaching activities or disturbed order 
and the normal operation of the school.10 The list of limitations to the students’ 
6 Monique Glasberg, Vincent Albinet and François Wenz-Dumas, ‘Le choc de l’Islam sur l’école 
de la République’, Libération (France), 21 October 1989.
7 Chikha, above n 4, 3.
8 The Conseil d’État has both a compulsory and an optional consultative function. In 
accordance with its optional consultative function, the government may seek the Conseil 
d’État’s opinion on a legal problem which it wishes to have clarified, as occurred in relation to 
the affair of the headscarf: Conseiller le gouvernement (2009) Conseil d’État <www.conseil-etat.
fr/cde/fr/conseiller> at 29 June 2009.
9 Conseil d’État Assemblée Générale (Section de l’intérieur), Port de signes d’appartenance à une 
communauté religieuse (foulard islamique), Avis No 346893, 27 November 1989, 1.
10 Ibid 5.
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freedom of expression and freedom of religious belief established that secularism was 
to be understood in conjunction with these freedoms. In practice, respect for both 
secularism and freedom of religion was to be a balancing act and establishing the 
balance would be one of the most difficult and contentious issues in the affair of the 
headscarf.
The legal opinion gave no indication of how schools should identify religious signs 
that might be considered ‘by their nature … ostentatious’ or the circumstances in 
which these signs might constitute ‘an act of pressure, provocation, proselytism 
or propaganda’. However, it noted that the attitudes and behaviour of students 
wearing the religious signs to school were to be important issues in deciding these 
questions.
The legal opinion also stated that schools were to negotiate these matters on a case-
by-case basis, rather than be decided at a national level. In this way, the Conseil 
d’État clearly indicated its preference for each incident to be resolved at a local level, 
rather than in accordance with a strict set of national guidelines.
The Conseil d’État’s legal opinion was greeted with mixed responses. It was criticised 
for appearing to support teachers and students alike by affirming the respective 
positions taken by Education Minister Jospin, the students, school principals and 
teachers, or at least not contradicting the public position of either side.11 This, as 
one article observed, relaunched the ‘soap opera’ in Creil.12 There was also some 
concern that the Conseil d’État had not defined either secularism or terms such as 
‘ostentatious’, ‘pressure’, ‘provocation’, ‘proselytism’ or ‘propaganda’, despite their 
importance as criteria by which a religious sign could be assessed.
Not all of the responses to the opinion were negative. English legal academic Sebastian 
Poulter observed approvingly that the Conseil d’État achieved ‘[a] balanced and 
sensible compromise … in a tense and complex situation through the application of 
legal principles relating to human rights’.13
Meanwhile, the three Creil schoolgirls were still isolated in their school library.14 On 2 
December, sisters Leila and Fatima returned to school without their headscarves and 
without explaining the reversal of their position. It soon became public knowledge 
that King Hassan of Morocco had approached the girls’ family and on the previous 
11 Bronwyn Winter, ‘Learning the Hard Way: The debate on women, cultural difference and 
secular schooling in France’ in John Perkins and Jürgen Tampke (eds), Europe: Retrospects and 
Prospects (1995) 203, 204.
12 ‘Le foulard à la carte’, L’Humanité (France), 29 November 1989.
13 Sebastian Poulter, ‘Muslim Headscarves in School: Contrasting Legal Approaches in England 
and France’ (1997) 17 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 43, 59.
14 Chikha, above n 4, 9.
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evening had summoned the two sisters and their father (who was of Moroccan origin) 
to the consulate in Paris to request that the girls stop wearing their headscarves.15 
The third girl, Samira, whose family was Tunisian, eventually returned to school 
without her headscarf on 26 January 1990.16 The first series of events in the affair of 
the headscarf, at least as far as these three students were concerned, had lasted just 
four months.17
Over the following weeks, the media and public interest in the affair began to subside. 
In the majority of cases, schools appeared to be dealing with matters on an individual 
basis and ‘a process of dialogue and a spirit of tolerance resulted in agreements which 
were acceptable to all parties’.18 It was these sorts of local resolutions that the Conseil 
d’État had indicated should be the desired outcome of the process of dialogue to be 
undertaken in each case.
Affair of the headscarf in the 1990s
Following parliamentary elections in March 1993, a conservative coalition 
government assumed office in the wake of the former Socialist-led government. 
As one article noted, this electoral victory marked the point at which ‘the official 
attitude toward Muslims … changed’. Illegal immigrants increasingly became 
targeted in police ‘round-ups’ and Algerians and other North Africans suspected 
of being or sympathising with fundamentalist militants were detained, sometimes 
without charge.19
In September 1994, the new conservative Education Minister François Bayrou 
‘[reignited] the controversy’ by announcing in a magazine interview that he intended 
to ban the wearing of headscarves in public schools.20 On 29 September 1994, 
he issued a ministerial circular21 that bore the unambiguous title of ‘Wearing of 
ostentatious signs in schools’. The circular recommended that schools take a firm 
stand, warning that the ‘secular and national ideal [that] is the very essence of the 
Republican school’ and the foundation of its duty to provide civic education was 
under threat from
15 Ibid 11.
16 Luis Cardoso, ‘Au Coeur de “l’Affaire”: Un Professeur de Creil témoigne’ (Paper presented at 
the ‘The Veil’ conference, University of North Carolina, 2000). 
17 According to Bloul, this first controversy continued for three months: Rachel Bloul, ‘From 
Moral Protest to Religious Politics: Ethical Demands and Beur Political Action in France’ 
(1998) 9 Australian Journal of Anthropology 11, 15.
18 Poulter, above n 13, 60.
19 ‘Ban on Islamic scarves renews debate’, The Tennessean (Nashville), 15 September 1994, 3A.
20 Ibid.
21 Ministerial circulars are issued to explain and clarify the application of legislation or 
jurisprudence in the relevant portfolio area.
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the presence and the proliferation of signs so ostentatious that their signification is 
precisely to separate certain students from the common rules of the school. These 
signs are, in themselves, elements of proselytism, particularly when they accompany 
challenges to certain classes or certain subjects, when they involve the safety of 
students or when they lead to disruptions to the collective life of the school.22
Bayrou’s circular urged school principals to redraft their schools’ internal regulations 
to include a ‘prohibition on these ostentatious signs’ and provided draft wording 
to serve as a model for the amended internal regulations. The suggested wording 
noted that although students were permitted to wear ‘discreet signs manifesting their 
personal commitment to beliefs, notably religious beliefs’, they were forbidden to 
wear ‘ostentatious signs, which constitute in themselves elements of proselytism or 
discrimination’. In addition, certain behaviours were prohibited:
provocative attitudes, failure to comply with the obligations of participation and 
safety, and behaviours likely to constitute pressure on other students, disrupt the 
progress of teaching activities or disturb order in the school.23
Although the circular did not refer to specific religious signs, it was widely understood 
to refer to the Islamic headscarf. Its effect was to ‘rebrand’ the headscarf, confirming 
that it could now be regarded as an ostentatious and divisive sign that constituted in 
itself an element of proselytism and discrimination. In so doing, the circular broadened 
the potential application of the Conseil d’État’s 1989 legal opinion, which had stated 
that ‘the wearing by students of [religious signs] is not by itself incompatible with the 
principle of secularism’. However, once the signs could be identified as ‘ostentatious’ 
or as constituting an act of pressure, provocation, proselytism or propaganda, they 
could be prohibited.
Bayrou’s circular also afforded support for those schools still wishing to ban the 
headscarf. As became clear from the subsequent legal decisions, a number of schools 
immediately incorporated the circular’s draft wording into their internal regulations 
and then applied the regulations to expel students wearing the headscarf. For example, 
in late 1994 two Strasbourg secondary schools amended their internal regulations to 
incorporate the wording suggested by Bayrou’s circular. The schools then requested 
that all Muslim girls wearing headscarves to school remove them or risk expulsion. 
Dozens refused and the schools suspended at least 38 girls, many of whom had 
been wearing the headscarves to school for many months, if not years. After their 
22 ‘Port de signes ostentatoires dans les établissements scolaires’ (1994) 35 Bulletin officiel de 
l’Éducation nationale 2528, 2528–9.
23 Ibid 2529.
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expulsions had been confirmed, 18 of these students commenced appeals against the 
expulsion decisions in Strasbourg’s administrative tribunal.24
The ‘headscarf ’ legal cases
During the 1990s, France’s administrative courts were starting to hear other appeals 
brought by expelled schoolgirls. Around half a dozen ‘headscarf cases’ were heard 
each year between 1992 and 1995, although by the end of the 1995 school year 
the controversy ‘appeared to have died down and the tide had turned in favour 
of the Muslim girls’.25 However, the number of legal proceedings surged in 1996 
and 1997, with administrative courts across the country hearing 38 and 21 cases 
respectively.26
The case law shows that the courts consistently ruled that wearing the headscarf was 
not inconsistent with secularism. More often than not, the cases were decided in the 
schoolgirls’ favour, although for the girls themselves this was sometimes a case of 
‘winning a battle but losing the war’. The outcomes of the cases heard in the busiest 
years of 1996 and 1997 are worth noting: in the overwhelming majority (around 
83 per cent) of these cases the schoolgirls’ expulsions were overturned by the courts, 
while in the remaining cases (approximately 15 per cent) the expulsions were upheld. 
However, it should be noted that most of the cases in which expulsion decisions 
were overturned tended to involve a single student, while those cases in which the 
expulsions were upheld often involved groups of students. Taking this factor into 
account, around 60 per cent of the students had their expulsions overturned and 
were entitled to return to school, while a sizeable minority of the students — 40 per 
cent — were unsuccessful in their appeals.
The case law provides some examples of judicial reasoning in relation to the wearing 
of the headscarf in public schools. On the whole, the courts considered and attempted 
to balance the various competing priorities. A relatively consistent set of principles 
emerged from the body of case law, based on the Conseil d’État’s legal opinion. In 
the most straightforward cases, a school was not to expel a student simply for wearing 
the headscarf. So, for example, in one 1996 case, a school principal had expelled a 
student whose return to school he had opposed while she was wearing the headscarf 
on the sole basis that ‘the wearing of this headscarf is by its nature incompatible with 
24 Michel Sousse, ‘Le tribunal de Strasbourg annule l’exclusion de 18 lycéennes qui portaient le 
foulard’, Libération (France), 21 April 1995.
25 Cynthia DeBula Baines, ‘L’Affaire des Foulards — Discrimination or the Price of a Secular 
Public Education System?’ (1996) 29 Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law 303, 307.
26 The cases can be obtained from legal archives on Legifrance, a French government website 
providing access to legislation and case law.
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the principle of secularism’. The Conseil d’État ruled that this reason was incorrect 
in law and overturned the girl’s expulsion.27
However, an expulsion could be justified if, in addition to wearing the headscarf, a 
student had engaged in political acts or activism, disturbed public order or teaching 
activities in the school by, for example, distributing brochures,28 circulating petitions 
or participating in public protests,29 or had breached her obligations to attend all 
classes or obey a teacher’s instructions.30 Such acts were considered to have introduced 
religious or political influences into the school or disturbed public order in the school 
and accordingly were found incompatible with secularism in public education. The 
Conseil d’État was particularly likely to uphold the expulsions of students who had 
attempted to proselytise to other students or who had actively participated in public 
protests against school prohibitions.
The number of cases heard by the administrative courts dwindled to a handful in the 
years between 1999 and 2003. No ‘headscarf ’ cases were decided in 2004 or 2005, 
although the period from 2006–08 saw a moderate surge of 17 cases appear before 
the courts.
The doctrine of secularism in France
Historical development of secularism
Contrary to some views, the position taken by the French government and public 
schools was not simply a reflection of anti-Muslim sentiment nor even a recently-
devised attempt to target the Islamic headscarf. Rather, it represents a contemporary 
manifestation of an historical policy of secularism whose original purpose was to 
prevent religious and political ideologies and activities from influencing public 
school students and curricula.
Indeed, from an historical perspective, secularism in France was developed to 
counter the formidable power of the established Catholic Church and to free the 
State’s public services, particularly its public schools, from the involvement and 
influence of the Church and clergy. Over many centuries, the Catholic Church had 
traditionally been responsible for education and had played an important role in 
administering schooling and maintaining public order in France. The Church and 
political institutions maintained close relations, as part of which Church officials 
27 Conseil d’État, No 170343, 20 May 1996.
28 Cour administrative d’appel de Lyon, No 96LY02608, 19 December 1997.
29 Conseil d’État, No 170207 170208, 27 November 1996.
30 Conseil d’État, No 159981, 10 March 1995.
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were paid public functionaries, and the institutions of each power supported the 
other in a liaison of mutual advantage.31
In 1789, the events of the Revolution led to the Declaration of the Rights of Man and 
the Citizen, which weakened the power of the Catholic Church as much as other 
institutions of the Ancien Régime by promoting the sovereignty and equality of 
the French people. In line with Enlightenment philosophy, the Declaration listed 
‘inalienable rights’ held by citizens by virtue of their being human, including freedom 
of religious belief, protected by article 10, which states, ‘No-one may be disturbed 
on the basis of his or her beliefs, even religious beliefs, as long as their manifestation 
does not interfere with the public order established by the law’.32
Although relations between the Catholic Church and the State were fraught with 
conflict over the course of the nineteenth century, the Church continued to play 
a key role in maintaining social stability and national loyalty in France. Religious 
education still had a place in the school curriculum under Napoléon and the 
clergy were salaried employees of the State. Indeed, the move towards secularism 
in education was prompted by the increasing numbers of clergy teaching in public 
schools. In 1879, ‘on the eve of the great secular laws, out of the 37,000 clerical 
teachers, half worked in the public primary schools’.33
The principal initiator of these secular laws was Jules Ferry, Minister for Public 
Instruction from 1879–83. His public education reforms, which were carried out 
in stages to facilitate their acceptance, implemented three main ideals: the equality 
of all children through the provision of free education; the right of all children to 
receive an education, which became a compulsory obligation for the students and a 
corresponding duty imposed on the State; and finally, secularism in public education, 
replacing ‘religious and moral instruction’ in the public school curriculum with ‘civic 
and moral instruction’.34
Increasingly hostile, Church-State relations in France were brought to a head by the 
Law of 9 December 1905.35 This law, which became known as the Separation Law, 
abrogated the 1801 Concordat negotiated between Napoléon and the papacy that had 
regulated Church-State relations and the status of religious orders in France for more 
31 Carlton J H Hayes, France: a Nation of Patriots (1974) 32.
32 La Déclaration des Droits de l’Homme et du Citoyen 1789 (Fr) art 10.
33 Louis Caperan (quoted in Collet, above n 5, 9).
34 W D Halls, Education, Culture and Politics in Modern France (1976) 7.
35 Relating to the Separation of Churches and State. Ironically, since he is forever associated 
with French secularism in public education, the 1905 Separation Law was not passed by Jules 
Ferry (who died in 1893) but by Bienvenu Martin, then Minister for Public Instruction. His 
full title at the time was Minister for Public Instruction, the Arts and Religions (my emphasis): 
‘Documents Parlementaires — Chambre’, 136.
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than a century, and introduced a range of administrative and procedural measures 
which effectively entrenched Church-State separation.36 The 1905 Separation Law 
has become incontrovertibly linked with secularism in France, although the word 
‘secularism’ appears nowhere in its provisions. Nonetheless, the law realised Jules 
Ferry’s desire for ‘the separation of these two worlds, the civil world and the religious 
world’.37
Rights and duties in secularism
At the time it was adopted, the Separation Law reflected the view of its legislators that 
the doctrine of secularism entailed more than administrative, financial or political 
separation from the Church: it was also bound up with rights and duties. Transcripts 
of parliamentary debates at the time of its adoption reveal heated disagreements 
dividing the ranks of parliamentarians.38 It is clear from the debates that concern 
for fundamental rights and freedoms played an important part in the arguments 
presented by both sides of Parliament,39 accompanied by concern for public order 
and the social unrest which opponents of secularism believed would follow Church-
State separation and its ‘violent rupture with all … traditional French politics’.40
Although it is associated with secularism, the Separation Law also enshrined 
guarantees of freedom of conscience and belief and freedom of religious expression. 
However, the law provided that the State could restrict these freedoms in the interests 
of public order, as is evident from article 1 of the Separation Law: ‘The Republic 
guarantees freedom of conscience. It guarantees the free exercise of religion under 
the sole restrictions decreed hereafter in the interests of public order’.41 Thus, from 
its earliest days, the doctrine of secularism has represented more than the separation 
of Churches and State — according to one of its foundation documents, it has also 
expressly upheld the right to religious freedom.
The preamble to the 1946 French Constitution (incorporated into the current 1958 
Constitution) reaffirmed the principle of secularism: ‘The provision of free, public 
and secular education at all levels is a duty of the State’.42 The 1958 Constitution 
36 Hayes, above n 31, 99–100.
37 Speech given by Jules Ferry, Saint-Quentin, 16 November 1871 (quoted in Collet, above n 5, 
11).
38 ‘Annales de la Chambre des Députés’, 21 March 1905, 1244; also ‘Annales de la Chambre des 
Députés’, 3 April 1905, 1494.
39 Georges Berry in ‘Annales de la Chambre des Députés’, 21 March 1905, 1238; also Gabriel 
Deville in ‘Annales de la Chambre des Députés’, 23 March 1905, 1296.
40 M Ribot in ‘Annales de la Chambre des Députés’, 3 April 1905, 1494.
41 Law of 9 December 1905 relating to the Separation of Churches and State (Fr) art 1.
42 Le Préambule de la Constitution du 27 octobre 1946. 
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later entwined rights and duties, stating in article 1: ‘France is an indivisible, secular, 
democratic and social Republic. It shall guarantee equality before the law of all citizens 
without distinction according to origin, race or religion. It shall respect all beliefs’.43
In 1989, the Conseil d’État stated in its legal opinion that ‘the principle of secularism 
necessarily implies respect for all beliefs’, basing this claim on article 10 of the 
Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen. The Conseil d’État also quoted 
from the Separation Law, which states that ‘the Republic guarantees freedom of 
conscience’. The Conseil d’État further emphasised that freedom of belief ‘must 
be regarded as one of the fundamental principles recognised by the laws of the 
Republic’. This freedom was to be interpreted and exercised alongside other rights 
and obligations that were also to be respected. According to the Conseil d’État, these 
rights and obligations included secularism.
More recently, French Parliaments have legislated to enshrine rights and duties of 
the State and students respectively in relation to public education.44 For example, 
article L141-1 of the 2000 Code of Education specifically incorporates and reaffirms 
the following constitutional principles:
The State shall guarantee equal access for children and adults to teaching, training 
and the acquisition of cultural knowledge and skills; the organisation of free, public 
and secular education at all levels is a duty of the State.
In addition, the Code sets out certain rights and responsibilities that attach to public 
school students. Article L141-2 of the Code goes some way towards protecting 
freedom of religion, although it also provides for the possibility of State limitations to 
this freedom: ‘The State shall make all necessary arrangements to guarantee freedom 
of religion and religious instruction to public school students’.
Student obligations are stated in article L511-1 as follows: ‘The obligations of 
students consist of carrying out the tasks inherent to their studies; these include 
participation and respect for the rules regarding the operation and the collective life 
of schools’, while article L511-2 sets out the students’ rights:
In lower secondary and secondary schools, pupils are acknowledged to have, while 
respecting pluralism and the principle of neutrality, freedom of information and 
freedom of expression. The exercise of these freedoms must not interfere with 
teaching activities.
43 La Constitution de 1958 art 1. 
44 See Law No 89-486 of 10 July 1989 on Direction in Education and Decree No 2000-549 of 
15 June 2000, which substantially amended the 1989 law.
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Debates over the interpretation of secularism in the affair of the headscarf can tend to 
overlook these constitutional and legislative guarantees of freedom of conscience and 
freedom of religious expression. But remember that the Conseil d’État acknowledged 
these guarantees in its 1989 legal opinion and that even according to its foundation 
texts, the principle of secularism was intended to encompass respect for freedom of 
belief.
The 2004 law on secularism
In 2004, the legal regime governing the wearing of the headscarf changed significantly 
when the French Parliament enacted legislation formally prohibiting the wearing of 
any religious signs in public schools. The legislation was based on recommendations 
presented to the government by the Commission to Consider the Application of the 
Principle of Secularism in the Republic, headed by Bernard Stasi, a former French 
and European parliamentarian and then-Ombudsman for the Republic. Over six 
months, the Commission interviewed members of the community during more 
than 100 public hearings and stimulated widespread debate on ‘the question of 
secularism’, before handing down its report in December 2003.
In the report’s preamble, the Commission emphasised the fundamental importance 
of secularism, calling it a ‘founding value and essential principle’ upon which 
the Republic was constructed. One recommendation that attracted considerable 
publicity called for the drafting of a new law on secularism to include the following 
provision:
In respect for freedom of belief and for the particular nature of private schools, 
clothing and signs manifesting a political or religious affiliation shall be prohibited 
in primary and secondary public schools. Any penalty must be proportionate and 
applied after the student has been invited to comply with his or her obligations.45
The Commission explained that the provision would apply to ‘visible signs, such 
as large crosses, headscarves, or [Jewish skullcaps]’ but would not extend to smaller 
‘discreet signs’ such as medallions or pendants consisting of small crosses, stars of 
David, Hands of Fatima or miniature Qur’ans.46 The examples of religious signs 
drawn from the three major religions practised in France — Roman Catholicism, 
Judaism and Islam — were a clear indication that the law was intended to apply to 
followers of all religions.
45 Rapport au Président de la République (2003) Commission de réflexion sur l’application 
du principe de laïcité dans la République <www.ladocumentationfrancaise.fr/brp/
notices/034000725.shtml> at 27 July 2009.
46 Ibid.
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The draft legislation, entitled ‘Bill concerning the application of the principle of 
secularism, the wearing of signs or clothing manifesting a religious affiliation in public 
schools, lower secondary and secondary schools’, was passed with overwhelming 
bipartisan support and greeted with applause across the benches. However, extensive 
protests were held in France and other countries across Europe to mark the concerns 
of many in the community about the enactment of the new law.47
The new law inserted the following provision into the Code of Education:
Art. L. 141-5-1 — In primary, lower secondary and secondary public schools, the 
wearing of signs or clothing by which students visibly manifest a religious affiliation 
is forbidden. The internal regulations note that the commencement of disciplinary 
proceedings shall be preceded by dialogue with the student.48
The prohibition applies to all visible signs which make the wearer’s religious affiliation 
immediately identifiable, meaning that the wearing of Islamic headscarves, Jewish 
skullcaps and oversized Christian crosses is now forbidden in public schools. Students 
wearing those signs are liable to be suspended or expelled.
French secularism in the European Court of Human Rights
In its report, the Stasi Commission had also considered the possibility that the law 
on secularism would conflict with article 9 of the Council of Europe’s Convention 
for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (‘the European 
Convention’),49 which protects the right to freedom of religion and freedom of 
religious manifestation. However, it recognised that the European Court of Human 
Rights tends to acknowledge ‘the traditions of each country, without seeking to 
impose a uniform model for relations between Church and State’, and leaves each 
State a ‘margin of appreciation’ with regard to Church-State relations. According to 
the Commission, ‘[t]he European Court in Strasbourg will protect secularism if it is 
47 In January 2004, tens of thousands of Muslims marched in protest against the proposed law 
on secularism in Paris, Marseille, Lille and other cities across France, while other protests were 
held in London, Berlin, Stockholm, Brussels, Cairo and Bethlehem: ‘Mobilisation contre le 
projet de loi sur la laïcité’, Le Monde (France), 17 January 2004; Jean-Paul Dufour, ‘Forte 
mobilisation à Lille’, Le Monde (France) 19 January 2004; Jon Henley, ‘French MPs reappraise 
plan to outlaw veils’, The Guardian (UK), 20 January 2004; Jon Henley, ‘France steps closer to 
Muslim headscarf ban’, The Guardian (UK), 30 January 2004.
48 Law No 2004-228 of 15 March 2004, art 1: applying the principle of secularism to regulate 
the wearing of signs or clothing manifesting a religious affiliation in public schools, lower 
secondary and secondary schools.
49 Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, opened for signature 
4 November 1950, CETS No 005 (entered into force 3 September 1953).
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a fundamental value of the State’ and, in addition, ‘permits limitations to freedom of 
expression in the public services, particularly if it is a question of protecting minors 
from external pressures’.50
At this stage, the European Court of Human Rights has not been required to consider 
whether the 2004 law on secularism might be contrary to the article 9 right to freedom 
of religion. However, on 4 December 2008, the court delivered its decisions in relation 
to two French ‘headscarf cases’,51 both arising from events that took place before the 
entry into force of the 2004 law on secularism. In both cases, the court found in favour 
of the French government and school authorities, confirming the expulsions of the two 
Muslim schoolgirl applicants because they wore the headscarf.
The two cases arose from similar events that occurred at around the same time and 
in the same school: two Muslim schoolgirls, aged 11 and 12 years old, wore their 
headscarves to physical education classes, were asked on a number of occasions to 
remove them, refused to do so and were expelled from the school. The girls’ families 
appealed against the expulsion until they had exhausted all available domestic legal 
options. Both girls then complained to the European Court of Human Rights that 
their expulsions violated article 9 of the European Convention protecting their right 
to freedom of religious expression and article 2 of Protocol No 1 to the European 
Convention protecting their right to education.
The court considered the two complaints together. It found that the school’s ban 
on wearing the headscarf during physical education and sports classes and the girls’ 
subsequent expulsions constituted a restriction on the exercise of their right to 
freedom of religion. However, it noted that article 9(2) of the European Convention 
provided that a person’s freedom to manifest his or her religion might be subject 
to certain limitations that are ‘prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic 
society in the interests of public safety, [to protect] public order, health or morals, or 
for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others’.
After considering the Conseil d’État’s 1989 legal opinion, ministerial circulars and the 
relevant case law, the court accepted that the restriction had a sufficient legal basis in 
domestic law and so could be regarded as having been ‘prescribed by law’. Furthermore, 
the restriction mainly pursued the legitimate aims of protecting the rights and freedoms 
of others and protecting public order.52 The court noted that article 9 of the European 
Convention did not protect every act motivated or inspired by a religion or belief. In 
50 Commission de réflexion sur l’application du principe de laïcité dans la République, above 
n 45, 20–1, 59.
51 Kervanci v France, No 31645/04, ECHR, 4 December 2008 (volume still unallocated) and 
Dogru v France, No 27058/05, ECHR, 4 December 2008 (volume still unallocated).
52 Kervanci v France and Dogru v France, [48], [59–60].
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a democratic society in which several religions coexisted in the same population, it 
might be necessary to restrict religious freedom in order to reconcile the interests of the 
various groups and ensure that everyone’s beliefs are respected.53
In the circumstances, the court considered that it was not unreasonable to conclude 
that wearing the headscarf was incompatible with sports classes for reasons of health 
or safety. Moreover, the various disciplinary proceedings against the schoolgirls fully 
satisfied the duty to undertake a balancing exercise of the various interests at stake. 
Finally, the penalty of expulsion from school did not appear disproportionate. The 
court found that the question of whether the schoolgirls had overstepped the limits 
of their right to express and manifest their religious beliefs on the school premises 
‘falls squarely within the margin of appreciation of the State’.
The court further noted that secularism was a constitutional principle and a founding 
principle of the French Republic, the protection of which appeared to be of primary 
importance, particularly in schools. An attitude that failed to respect that principle 
would not necessarily be covered by the freedom of religious manifestation and 
would not be protected by article 9 of the European Convention.54
Accordingly, having regard to the circumstances of the cases and to ‘the margin of 
appreciation that should be left to the States in this domain’, the court concluded that 
the restriction in question was justified as a matter of principle and proportionate to 
the aim pursued. As a result, it ruled that there had been no violation of article 9 of 
the European Convention.55
The 2010 law to ban the burqa
The affair of the headscarf, and the profound social and political fragmentation 
which it both reflected and catalysed, subsided somewhat in 2005. However, the 
debate over religious clothing in France was not finished. In 2009, President Nicolas 
Sarkozy announced in a speech to Parliament that the full-face or full-body veil 
(‘voile intégral’), also known as the burqa or niqab, was not welcome in France. 
The government also announced the formation of a parliamentary commission to 
examine the practice of wearing the burqa in France.
In January 2010, the commission reported back to the National Assembly. Its 
report noted conflicting issues such as secular rights and responsibilities in France; 
Republican nationalism; militant religious fundamentalism; the constraining 
influences of parents, family and community on some Muslim girls and women; 
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and freedom of movement, as well as the choices and desires of Muslim women 
themselves with regards to their clothing.
The report also made a number of recommendations, the first of which stated that the 
burqa should be condemned as contrary to Republican values and that discrimination 
and violence against women should also be condemned. Other recommendations 
advised that immigration and refugee laws should be amended to require would-be 
citizens and refugees to accept values such as equality of the sexes and the principle 
of secularism and to allow the refusal of residency status and citizenship to religious 
fundamentalists. Recommendation 13 advocated the adoption of a law which would 
prohibit the hiding of one’s face in public places.56
Following this report, both houses of the French Parliament passed a law prohibiting 
the wearing of clothing which would conceal a person’s face in public places. Any 
breaches of the law may attract a maximum fine of 150 euros or citizenship classes, or 
both. The law also prohibits anyone from forcing another person to conceal the face, 
on penalty of one year’s imprisonment and a 30,000 euro fine. Both penalties are 
doubled if the person being so constrained is a minor. The law, which received strong 
support from both sides of politics and was approved by France’s Constitutional 
council, came into force on 11 April 2011.
Moreover, France is not the only European country to introduce a ban on the burqa: 
the Belgian government enacted similar legislation in 2010, while parliaments 
in Italy, Holland, Spain, Germany, Denmark and the UK have also debated the 
adoption of laws banning the burqa.
Conclusions
Legislating against clothing
One issue that arises in the context of a ban on wearing the headscarf is the practical 
difficulty of legislating against everyday items such as clothing or jewellery. For 
example, it is arguably difficult to determine when a headscarf might be a religious 
or cultural sign, as opposed to an item of clothing with no particular significance.
The question of distinguishing between an Islamic headscarf and a headscarf with no 
religious characteristics, or indeed between an Islamic headscarf and other religious 
items of clothing, was raised on a number of occasions in France. For example, one 
Muslim girl suspended from her school in Avignon for wearing the headscarf noted 
56 Mission d’information sur la pratique du port du voile intégral sur le Territoire national, 
Rapport d’information fait en application de l’article 145 du Règlement, Assemblée Nationale, 
No. 2262, 26 January 2010, 123–85.
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that she had worn it to school since 1982 and that this was the first time she had 
been penalised for doing so. Her father commented, ‘If she had been preaching 
Islam I would understand, but this, it’s just a scarf ’.57 Some Muslims also pointed 
out that devout Jewish and Christian women wear the headscarf as well, and that the 
Virgin Mary herself is rarely portrayed without one.58
Clearly, in the context of the affair of the headscarf, the headscarf itself functioned 
as something more than an item of clothing. Its symbolic nature was evident in the 
compromise solution proposed to the schoolgirls in Creil: their headscarves would be 
accepted in the school courtyard and corridors on condition that they were lowered 
to the girls’ shoulders during classes.59 In other words, the powerful symbolism of the 
headscarf could be countered with a symbolic gesture of equal or greater power.
Sometimes it appeared to depend on what the headscarf looked like. In one school, 
the principal persuaded a schoolgirl to wear a headscarf ‘à la provençale’. According 
to one of the girl’s teachers, she used to wear ‘one [headscarf ] with little ducks on it 
and another with flowers. It was pretty’.60 Clearly, the schoolgirl’s headscarf could 
be more easily accepted (or overlooked) when it appeared to be a rural-style or 
fashionable headscarf displaying flowers or animals, rather than a black headscarf 
that might be construed as consistent with religious and political fundamentalism.
Moreover, how did the headscarf compare with other religious signs or clothing such as 
the cross or the Jewish kippa, or skullcap? In 1994, Education Minister François Bayrou’s 
circular distinguished between ‘discreet signs’ worn by students that manifested ‘their 
personal commitment to [religious] beliefs’. It was generally assumed that jewellery 
displaying a Christian cross or crucifix was likely to be considered discreet and 
therefore acceptable. Similarly, there was nothing to indicate that the 1994 prohibitions 
would affect other religious clothing such as the kippa. The Jewish community had 
been concerned since the early days of the affair that the kippa might constitute an 
‘ostentatious’ sign.61 They were reassured in 1989 by Education Minister Lionel Jospin, 
and again in 1994 when Prime Minister Édouard Balladur expressly assured Jewish 
leaders at a community dinner that the kippa did not have an ‘ostentatious character’.62 
57 Chantal Seignoret, ‘“C’est juste un foulard”’, La Croix (France), 25 October 1989.
58 ‘À bas Rushdie, vive le foulard!’ L’Évènement du Jeudi (France), 19 November 1989.
59 ‘Quand l’islam fait école’, Le Quotidien de Paris (France), 21 October 1989.
60 Anne Fohr, ‘École: la déchirure’, Le Nouvel Observateur (France), 6 October 1994, 46.
61 ‘Le couvre-chef dans le judaïsme’, Les nouveaux Cahiers (1994) 37 (quoted in Dominique Le 
Tourneau, ‘La laïcité à l’épreuve de l’Islam: le cas du port du “foulard islamique” dans l’école 
publique en France’ (1997) 28 Revue générale de Droit 275, 294).
62 Philippe Bernard, ‘Marceau Long s’interroge sur la validité de la circulaire Bayrou à propos du 
foulard islamique’, Le Monde (France), 20 September 1994; also Henri Tincq, ‘De l’autre côté 
du voile’, Le Monde, 30 November 1994.
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Yet as Marceau Long, Vice-President of the Conseil d’État, asked in 1994, ‘How can 
one say that the headscarf is ostentatious but that the kippa [or] the huge crosses or 
crucifixes which appear to be fashionable once again are not?’63
Such contradictions highlight the difficulty of legislating against the wearing of items 
of clothing: where are the limits of such legislation and how are they to be monitored 
or enforced? These questions arose in France when the Stasi Commission handed 
down its report and recommendations on secularism in 2004. Commenting on the 
proposed law, Education Minister Luc Ferry speculated that in addition to religious 
signs, beards or bandanas worn by students might also be prohibited if they appeared 
to be ‘religious’: ‘As soon as anything becomes a religious sign, it will fall under this 
law’.64 The Minister failed to speculate on the practical difficulties of identifying 
a beard or a bandana that might be a religious sign and of distinguishing them 
from ones that were not. Moreover, the debate has recently resumed in France over 
the question of whether to ban Muslim women from wearing the burqa or niqab 
in public places and whether Muslim women who cover themselves completely in 
public constitute an assault on secularism and women’s rights.65
Similar issues have arisen in Australia. In November 2002, a member of the New 
South Wales Legislative Council, Fred Nile, called for a ban on Muslim women 
wearing the chador (which consists of the headscarf and a long cloak covering the 
body) in public places in Australia for fear that they might be concealing weapons 
beneath their clothing. His call ignored the fact that in practice a range of other 
everyday clothing including trench coats and ponchos can also conceal weapons. 
More recently, in July 2009, a Muslim woman wearing a face-veil on a Sydney bus 
was approached by the bus driver and told to ‘remove her mask’. The woman accused 
the driver of discrimination and asked him what the difference was between what 
she was wearing and the swine flu masks that many people were then choosing to 
wear.66
Limiting judicial discretion
Another issue is the question of how to construct a legal regime that protects rights 
and responds to a variety of needs and circumstances. Before 2004, the legal regime 
in France governing the wearing of the headscarf was based on the Conseil d’État’s 
1989 legal opinion and its application by the administrative courts in each ‘headscarf ’ 
63 Bernard, above n 62.
64 Jon Henley, ‘Veil ban may extend to “religious” beards’, The Guardian (UK), 21 January 2004.
65 ‘Port de la burka en France: des députés réclament une commission d’enquête parlementaire’, 
Le Point (France), 17 June 2009.
66 Simon Santow, Muslim woman ‘culturally raped’ in veil bus row (2009) ABC News Online 
<www.abc.net.au/news/stories/2009/07/30/2641498.htm> at 31 July 2009.
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case. In its opinion, the Conseil d’État had not ruled definitively either for or against 
wearing the headscarf. Rather, it had identified relevant constitutional and legislative 
provisions and extrapolated a set of guiding principles relating to secular public 
education, freedom of religion and the rights and obligations of students. When the 
courts applied these principles to the different circumstances of each case, a pattern 
of judicial responses and indeed protection emerged.
Overall, the ‘headscarf ’ cases reflected an inclination on the part of the courts — 
and the law which they applied — to protect the education and religious freedom 
of Muslim schoolgirls wearing the headscarf, while also upholding principles of 
secularism by protecting the ‘public order’ which marked the limits of the students’ 
rights.
The courts ruled consistently that a school could not expel a student simply for 
wearing the headscarf or in the absence of a lawful ground. At the same time, they 
also applied the obligations that had been imposed on students to respect public 
order and observe their responsibilities to attend and participate in school classes 
and activities, and penalised students if these obligations were breached. As a result, 
as I noted earlier, in those cases where expulsions were upheld, for the most part the 
students had at least participated actively in the events that led to their expulsion. 
By incrementally negotiating judicial responses to particular circumstances arising 
in the affair of the headscarf, the courts were contributing to the construction of a 
working definition of secularism that encompassed both rights and duties, and were 
adapting secularism to the specific challenges posed by significant numbers of the 
population, who, while they were French, were also insisting on their right to be 
recognised as Muslims.
In practice, the legal cases appeared to function as a practical vindication of the key 
principles and indeed the flexibility advocated by the Conseil d’État in its 1989 legal 
opinion. The Conseil d’État had sought to balance a number of priorities, including 
freedom of religion and secularism, while also providing principles to guide the 
application of the law in accordance with the circumstances of each case. Its caution 
and apparent imprecision enabled restrictions to the wearing of religious signs such 
as the headscarf to be interpreted broadly and applied flexibly. The outcomes of the 
cases, in which the majority of the students’ expulsions were overturned, reflected 
the equitable nature of the Conseil d’État’s legal opinion. A more narrowly-defined 
definition of secularism prohibiting the display of all religious symbols, such as that 
proposed by Education Minister Bayrou in 1994, would have fettered the courts’ 
attempts to respect the complex mesh of principles articulated in the Conseil d’État’s 
1989 legal opinion.
Yet in 2004, the law on secularism effectively redefined secularism in a narrower 
sense, restricting and penalising students’ choices in relation to clothing or signs 
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that might be both visible and religious, with potentially serious consequences for 
the students’ right to freedom of religious expression. In doing so, the law radically 
changed the previous legal regime, imposing an outright ban on the wearing of 
visible religious signs and eliminating the degree of judicial discretion and flexibility 
that administrative courts could exercise in assessing the circumstances of each case 
and reaching their decisions. Under the new legislation, Muslim girls wearing the 
headscarf may be expelled from school whether or not they have engaged in political 
or proselytising activities, disrupted teaching or disturbed public order.
In this way, the 2004 law on secularism changed the delicate judicial balance that 
French administrative courts, particularly the Conseil d’État, had worked to achieve 
throughout the 1990s. Furthermore, the law compromises rights which secularism 
and the Republic are supposed to uphold. As a result, it has significant implications 
for the doctrine of secularism itself in France.
Forms of secularism
Finally, this chapter returns to the issue of secularism as a formal policy and cultural 
and community value. Clearly, the affair of the headscarf in France was an opportunity 
to consider very carefully the operation and institutions of secularism in a modern 
context. There was broad general agreement that secularism was an important 
principle in contemporary France, although many people were nonetheless unsure 
of how to interpret and apply secularism and secular values to the circumstances of 
the affair of the headscarf.
There was also considerable disagreement over how the doctrine of secularism should 
be understood and its implications: was it ‘hardline’ secularism or a flexible variety? 
‘Hardline’ secularism would require that strict neutrality of the public service be 
respected by prohibiting all public school students from manifesting any religious 
beliefs and limiting all manifestations of religion to those displays or practices which 
could take place in the students’ private lives or on weekends. In contrast, a more 
flexible interpretation of secularism would provide a forum in which all religious 
beliefs could be acknowledged and expressed equally. This variety of secularism 
would accept all beliefs, recognising that their expression in the form of an outward 
religious sign — such as the headscarf — was a matter of individual right.67
Certainly, there were other factors at play in the affair of the headscarf that meant 
that it was not simply a conflict between secular values and freedom of religious 
expression. In 1989, Jospin noted some of these factors: the emergence of ‘a powerful 
anti-Arab feeling’ stemming from the Algerian war of independence; the controversial 
issue of immigration; socio-economic problems such as unemployment and 
67 Le Tourneau, above n 61, 289.
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inadequate housing for many Muslim people; and, finally, ‘the question of French 
national identity and the place that foreigners can have in it’. According to Jospin, 
the fact that the French community ‘could become so inflamed about [the affair of 
the headscarf was] most certainly a sign of unease’ about issues such as these.68
It is worth noting that in 1905, the heated parliamentary debates that took place 
when the Separation Law was passed were also based on deep concern that Church-
State separation would weaken or even destroy the Republic. Perhaps the unease 
arising from the affair of the headscarf reflected a more contemporary concern that 
aspects of modern secularism were proving inadequate to the challenges of a modern 
French Republic.
What does the affair of the headscarf mean for other countries such as Australia? In 
many ways, the situation in Australia is very different from that in France: Australia 
has no formal legislative or constitutional separation of Church and State, nor is 
secularism an important social, cultural and community value in the way that it is 
in France. Moreover, legislation such as the 2004 law on secularism could not be 
passed in Australia, since s 116 of the Constitution prohibits our Commonwealth 
Parliament from legislating on matters of religion.
However, like France, Australia has no established or State religion. In the 2006 
Census, although the most common religious affiliations reported were Catholic 
(26 per cent) and Anglican (19 per cent), 19 per cent of the population also stated 
that they had no religion, an increase from 16 per cent in 2001.69 Many Australians 
would feel comfortable with a claim that we are a secular State. Indeed, in 2007, a 
booklet published by the Australian government to inform aspiring citizens about 
Australian culture stated that this country has a secular government and that freedom 
of religion and secular government are important values in modern Australia.70
If this is so, how important is the doctrine of secularism to Australian culture and the 
Australian community? Do we believe that secular values should be protected? If so, 
how and what would be the extent of any such protection? What form of secularism 
do we want in Australia? Should it be clearly articulated and understood? Perhaps 
in practice a complex and abstract principle such as secularism works best when it 
remains undefined and when it is not restricted by concrete examples of what it is or 
is not, the circumstances in which it should or should not apply or, as in the affair 
68 Lionel Jospin, ‘Now or Never’ in Anne Corbett and Bob Moon (eds), Education in France: 
Continuity and Change in the Mitterand Years, 1981–1995 (1996) 76–7.
69 Australian Bureau of Statistics, 2006 Census QuickStats: Australia — Religious Affiliation: Main 
responses for Australia (2006). 
70 Commonwealth of Australia, Becoming an Australian citizen (2007) 5–6.
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of the headscarf in France, the particular religious signs with which it is or is not 
compatible.
Similarly, how can Australia best enshrine freedom of religion in a way that provides 
meaningful protections to those practising a wide variety of religions and beliefs 
in the community? What restrictions would Australians impose on the rights to 
freedom of religion and freedom of religious expression? Should Australian law allow 
a ‘margin of appreciation’ to apply to certain manifestations of religious freedom, or 
to any restrictions on such freedom?
In considering these questions, it may be helpful to look to and learn from the events 
of the affair of the headscarf in France. Should we regard the affair negatively, as a 
suppression of the schoolgirls’ right to manifest their religious beliefs by wearing the 
headscarf, or positively, as a protection of pluralism and secular cultural values? In 
France, these events constituted a modern challenge for secularism, signalling that 
there were still important questions to ask about the nature and role of contemporary 
secularism in society. In Australia, just as in France, these are also questions to which 
the government and the people must respond, and the response must not divide 
people along lines of religion, ethnicity, socio-economic status or politics in the 
name of ‘social peace and national cohesion’.71 In Australia and in France, the face 
of secularism — and religious freedom — must reflect the changing face of the 
community.
71 ‘Dossier d’actualité: Réaffirmer le principe de laïcité’, 10 February 2004. 
